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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
E. A. RUSSELL and MARTEL E.
RUSSELL,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
PARK CITY UTAH CORPORATION, a
corporation,
Defendant-Appellant,

)
)

)
)
)

Case No.

) 12879

THE MAJOR-BLAKENEY CORPORATION,)
a corporation; and ROBERT w.
MAJOR,
)
Defendants.

)

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs-Respondents brought this
action seeking to have the Court determine
that a certain Lease and Purchase Agreement
executed by them and Defendant MajorBlakeney Corporation, whose interest had
thereafter been assigned to DefendantAppellant Park City Utah Corporation, "has

been and now is terminated and cancelled"
and to recover $2,500.00 liquidated damages.
(R. 2)

DISPOSITION IN TIIE LOWER COURT
Following discovery, which consisted
primarily of the taking of the deposition
of the Defendant Robert W. Major by
Respondents, the latter filed a motion for
summary judgment "upon the ground and for
the reason that the pleadings and other
documents on file herein, together with the
deposition of Defendant Robert W. Major,
show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that Plaintiffs are
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
(R. 79)

This motion was granted by the

court after the submission of briefs and
oral argument by the respective parties.
(R. 127)

On March 17, 1972, the lower

court entered summary judgment in favor of
Respondents and against Appellant,
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determining that said Lease and Purchase
Agreement "was and is properly terminated
and cancelled and is no longer in force
and effect" and awarded Respondents the
sum of $2,500.00 liquidated damages.

(R. 180)

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
As stated by Appellant in its brief,
it "seeks a reversal of the summary judgment
granted by the lower court and a remand of
the matter for trial; or, in the alternative,
Appellant seeks a reversal of the lower
court's denial of Appellant's order to show
cause and a determination by this Court
that Appellant is entitled to the restoration provisions of Section 78-36-10 Utah
Code Anno., 1953 (as amended)."
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since reference will be made to
testimony and exhibits appearing in the
deposition of Defendant Robert W. Major,
as well as pleadings and exhibits thereto
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appearing in the Record, reference to the
Record will be by the designation "R" and
to the deposition by ''D" with the appropriate page number or exhibit number given.
Plaintiffs-Respondents will be referred to
as "Respondents" and Defendant-Appellant
Park City Utah Corporation will be referred
to as "Appellant."

The other Defendants

will be referred to by name or by Defendant.
Respondents entered into a "Lease
and Purchase Agreement" with Defendant MajorBlakeney Corporation, Appellant's predecessor, which agreement is dated March 31,
1967.

(R. 37-44)

Thereafter, on or about

August 7, 1968, Defendant Major-Blakeney
Corporation assigned "all of its right,
title and interest in and to" said lease
to Appellant, by which assignment Appellant
agreed "to faithfully perform" the obligations imposed under the agreement.

(R. 33)

The lease between Respondents and Major-4-

Blakeney Corporation was prepared by
attorney William Richards who was acting
as the attorney for the lessee, Defendant
Major-Blakeney Corporation.

(D. 10, 11)

Although the lease year ran from March 31
of each year to March 31 of the succeeding
year (commencing with the year 1967), the
rental payments of $2.50 per acre for
approximately 2,000 acres was payable on
or before the 1st day of November of each
year commencing with the year 1967 so that
the annual rental payment did not become
due until over half of the rental year had
expired.

(R. 37)

The rental due and

payable on November 1, 1967, was paid on
said date.

(Exh. P-1)

For the next lease

period--March 31, 1968, to March 31, 1969-the rent was paid by a check mailed with a
letter dated December 5, 1968.
Exh. P-2)

(D. 26, 27t

For the following year the

lease payment was made on or about December
-5-

15, 1969.

(D. 29; Exh. P-3)

Thereafter,

when the rent came due on November 1, 1970
(for the period March 31, 1970, to March 31,
1971), no payment was made (D. 31) even
though payment was received by Appellant
from the sublessee in the amount of $7,768.28.

(D. 34, 35; Exh. P-4)
Defendant Robert W. Major, who at
all times was Appellant's agent (D. 36),
testified that prior to the end of the
calendar year 1970 he was aware that
Appellant had not paid Respondents (D. 41)
and that after discussing it with the
accountant for Appellant corporation it
was decided that Appellant would seek to
have the sublessee pay the rental rather
than Appellant paying it.

(D. 39-41)

Subsequently, under date of March 3, 1971,
the law firm of Richards and Richards
wrote a letter to Respondent E. A. Russell
stating that "the sublessee through its
-6-

president, Mr. Robert W. Ensign, is being
requested to pay you directly in this
instance, for which my client will credit
their account to that extent."
Exh. P-6)

(D. 47-49;

Thereafter, under date of March

9, 1971, a letter was sent to Mr. Major
stating that the sublessee "does not accept
your attempted unilateral assignment to
the Russells of any override which may be
owing in the future.

This 'convenient'

way of attempting to avoid your responsibility to the Russells should not impress
them any more than it does" the sublessee.
A copy of this letter was also sent to
Appellant's attorney.

(D. 50; Exh. P-7)

Thereafter, on March 12, 1971, a
notice was sent by the lessors, pursuant
to the provisions of paragraph VIII of the
lease, directed to Appellant Park City
Utah Corporation in c/o William S. Richards,
its attorney, advising Appellant of the
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default in the payment of rent and specifying
that unless such default is corrected "on
or before 45 days from receipt of this
notice, lessor shall consider this lease
terminated and cancelled."

This notice

was received by Appellant on March 12, 1971.
(Exh. P-8)

The notice of default was sent

to Appellant in c/o Richards and Richards,
attorneys for said corporation, at 1610
Walker Bank Building pursuant to the
assigmnent from "Defendant Major-Blakeney
Corporation to Appellant and further
pursuant to the notice given by Appellant
to Respondents under date of December 5,
1968.

(R. 34, deposition Exh. P-2)

The

notice which was sent certified mail was
receipted for Park City Utah Corporation
by Lala Gallegos at the address indicated
on March 12, 1971.

(Exh. P-8)

The notice was followed up by a
subsequent letter dated March 29, 1971,
-8-

sent to Defendant Robert W. Major, Jr.,
with a copy to William S. Richards, attorney,
in which it was stated that the default
"uust be corrected on or before April 26,
1971, in accordance with the terms of the
Russell lease."

(Exh. P-9)

Nd attempt was made to correct the
default in the lease until June 7, 1971,
at which time a letter was sent to
Respondents' attorney enclosing a check in
the amount of $4,855.18 which represented
the principal amount of the rent due the
preceding November 1, 1970, but without
inclusion of any interest.

(Exh. P-10)

The only reason given for the failure
to pay the lease payment due November 1,
1970, was that Appellant was going to seek
to have the sublessee pay it because
Appellant felt that the sublessee owed
Appellant various sums of money on account
of other transactions between the parties.
-9-

(D. 63-67)

Appellant "Park City Utah

Corporation had the money to pay the rent
if it had wanted to pay it" during the
entire period of time.

(D. 67)

As stated

in Respondents' answers to Appellant's
interrogatories, the attempted tender of
rent on June 7, 1971, "was wholly inadequate
and insufficient to pay the rent, together
with interest which had accrued thereon, or
to satisfy the terms and conditions of said
lease and purchase agreement."

(R. 124)

Because of the Appellant's failure
to pay the annual rental due and owing
November 1, 1970, in the amount of $4,855.20
after formal notice given as required by
the terms of said lease, said lease
agreement was terminated, forfeited and
cancelled; and on June 24, 1971, Respondents
filed an action in the District Court of
Summit County, State of Utah, requesting
the Court to adjudge and determine-that
-10-

said lease and purchase agreement "has
been and now is terminated and cancelled"
and further requesting the Court to award
Plaintiffs the sum of $2,500.00 damages as
provided by paragraph VIII of the said
agreement."

(R. 1, 2)

Defendants Major-Blakeney Corporation
and Robert W. Major respectively filed
separate motions to quash service of summons
and to dismiss.

(R. 49, 50)

Thereafter

Plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss without
prejudice as to those Defendants (R. 169)
which was granted.

(R. 182)

Appellant Park City Utah Corporation
filed an answer and counterclaim in which
it admitted the execution of the Lease and
Purchase Agreement and the assignment
thereof by Major-Blakeney Corporation to
Appellant by which Appellant assumed the
obligations of said Lease and agreed "to
faithfully perform the same.
-11-

(R. 53, 32)

The only defense raised by Appellant
was a denial and the claim that Respondents
"waived that certain provision of said
Lease and Purchase Agreement relating to a
rental payment date of November 1 by and
through their past practice and conduct
which consistently permitted and allowed
this defendant to make the rental payment
in the spring of the year following the
November 1 date" (R. 54 ); and further that
it had tendered payment of $4,855.18 on
June 7, 1971 "as the full rental payment
then due" which had been refused; and
Appellant stood ready and willing to pay
said sum to Respondents.

(R. 54)

With respect to the allegation of
the complaint that Respondents should be
awarded the sum of $2,500.00 liquidated
damages, Appellant admitted that the Lease
and Purchase Agreement provides for the
payment of the sum of $2,500.00 as
-12-

liquidated damages in the event of default
but alleged that there was no default in the
lease and further that the provision relating
to liquidated damages "is invalid and unenforceable for the reason that it constitutes an
illegal penalty."

(R. 53)

This was the posture of the pleadings
in the case at the time Respondents filed
their motion for summary judgment.

However,

following the hearing in court on the motion
for summary judgment on February 7, 1972 (R. 81),
Appellant filed a motion for leave to file an
amended counterclaim purporting to set forth
new and additional defenses to the complaint.
This motion was denied by the court (R. 180)
and no claim is made on this appeal of any
error of the court in such action.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Appellant has assigned as error the
granting of Respondents' motion for summary
judgment because Appellant claims "there
-13-

exists general disputes as to material
issues of fact."

Appellant also contends

that the lower court "erroneously applied
the law to the undisputed facts presented by
the instant matter."

In this connection

Appellant contends:
A.

There was no default by Appellant

on which to predicate a forfeiture;
B.

Even if there was a default,

Appellant is entitled to equitable relief
from the forfeiture;

c.

Appellant is entitled to invoke

the provisions of Section 78-36-10, UCA,

1953 (as amended);
D.

The lower court erred in awarding

$2,500.00 "liquidated damages;" and
E.

By granting Respondents' motion

for summary judgment, Appellant was denied
"severable and distinct privileges" inuring
to it under the lease agreement.
These claims will be argued-in the
-14-

sequence in which they appear in Appellant's
brief.

ARGUMENT
I

ALLEGED ERROR IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The issues, as framed by the pleadings
at the time of the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment, consisted of the following:
1.

Whether there was a default in the

payment of rent;
2.

Whether such default had continued

after proper notice had been given to correct
the same;
3.

Whether there had been any waiver

of the provisions for the prompt payment of
rent by reason of past conduct; and
4.

Whether the provision for $2,500.00

liquidated damages was enforceable.
At the risk of being repetitious,
Respondents call attention of the Court to
the following undisputed facts appearing in
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the Record:
1.

Appellants entered into a "Lease

and Purchase Agreement" with the Defendant
Major-Blakeney Corporation under date of March
31, 1967.
2.

(R. 37-44)
The agreement was prepared by the

attorney for Defendant Major-Blakeney
Corporation, the lessee.
3.

(D. 11-12)

Thereafter, said Defendant Major-

Blakeney Corporation assigned its rights and
obligations in and to said Lease and Purchase
Agreement to Appellant corporation which
assumed all obligations of lessee in connection therewith.
4.

(R. 32-34)

Said assignment further provides

that all notices in respect thereto shall be
mailed to the Park City Utah Corporation at
the offices of its attorney in the Walker
Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah.
34; D. 18)
assigned.

(R. 33,

The lease was never thereafter
(D. 19)
-16-

5.

Although by its terms the lease

commenced March 31, 1967, paragraph I
relating to the payment of rent provides
that "lessee agrees to commence the annual
rental payments on the 1st day of November,
1967, and to make said payments the 1st day
of November of each and every year thereafter
during the term of this lease."
6.

(R. 37)

Paragraph VIII of the Lease and

Purchase Agreement provides for the remedies
of the lessor in the event of default in the
provisions of the lease.

It states as

follows:
"No default of Lessee in any of
the provisions hereof shall constitute
a basis for forfeiture of this lease
unless the same shall continue for
more than forty-five (45) days after
written notice to Lessee specifying
of what the default consists, and in
the event Lessee fails to correct
said default within such further time
as is reasonably necessary to cure
the same, Lessee shall quit and
surrender the premises to Lessors
subject to the reservation contained
in paragraph II above. Because of
the difficulties in ascertaining the
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damages that would thus be sustained,
if any, by Lessors, it is agreed that
Lessee shall pay to Lessors the sum
of $2,500 as exclusive, fixed and
liquidated damages.
"Any and all agreements, covenants
and conditions hereinbefore stipulated
shall apply to, benefit and bind the
heirs, successors, executors, administrators and assigns of the respective
parties hereto." (R. 44)
7.

Mr. Richards, attorney for lessee,

was responsible for putting this provision
in the lease.
8.

(D. 17)

The rent due and payable to lessor

under said lease for the first year of the
lease was paid on or about November 9,
1967.

(Exh. P-1)
9.

Under date of December 5, 1968,

Appellant directed a notice to Respondents
advising them that Appellant was the assignee
of Defendant Major-Blakeney Corporation and
the "lessee on the lease insofar as you
gentlemen are concerned."
10.

(Exh. P-2; D. 26)

At the same time Appellant paid

the rent due on November 1, 1968.
-18-

(Exh. P-2)

11.

Under date of December 15, 1969,

Appellant paid the lease payment due November
1, 1969, for the lease period March 31, 1969,
to March 31, 1970.
12.

(Exh. P-3)

When the rent came due on November

1, 1970, no payment was made or attempted by
Appellant.
13.

(D. 30, 31)
Around Christmas, 1970, there were

discussions between and among the officers
and directors of Appellant regarding what
should be done about paying the rent.
14.

(D. 38-40)

Defendant Robert W. Major acted

as agent for Appellant from the beginning
and was its agent during this period of time.
(D 36, 37)

15.

Particularly, on one occasion

prior to the end of the year 1970 and probably
in December, Mr. Jim Allen (Appellant's
accountant) talked to Robert W. Major
concerning the payment of the rent due on
November 1, 1970.

Mr. Allen wanted to know
-19-

if he was to pay the rent due on November 1,
1970, before the end of the calendar year in
order for the corporation to take a deduction
for it in that year.

At that time Mr. Major

told Mr. Allen that it was the consensus of
the group (referring to the officers and
directors of Appellant Park City Utah
Corporation) that the rent not be paid; that
Mr. Major "was going to urge our attorneys"
to urge the Ensign-Aspen group to pay the
Russells and set off that amount against the
amount which Appellant claimed was owing by
the Ensign-Aspen group to it; that since the
Ensign-Aspen group "were less than responsible
people and had in the past been delinquent,
measurably delinquent on payments owing us
and innumerable other firms and people" that
Appellant should attempt to get them to pay
direct to Respondents rather than Appellant
making the payment.
16.

(D. 38-40)

This was the plan discussed by
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and agreed to by Robert W. Major, the
"Slagles," the Nelsons and Allen Bunnage,
officers and directors of Appellant corporation.

It had also been discussed with the
Richards and Richards.
17.

(D. 44, 45)

At that time Mr. Allen was

concerned "about why wasn't the payment
being made so we could get a tax deduction
for it."

18.

(D. 40, 41)
The general idea was to leave

Respondents to collect the rent from the
sublessee Ensign Company (D. 40), although
the sublessee had already paid to Appellant
the sum of $7,768.28 under date of November
9, 1970, as and for rent under the sublease
for the period August 1, 1970, through July
31, 1971.
19.

(Exh. P-4)
This was the only reason for

failure or refusal to pay the rent to
Appellant.
20.

(D. 63-67)
Appellant had the money to pay
-21-

the rent at all times during the period in
question and could have paid it if it had
wanted to do so.
21.

(D. 67)

No attempt was made by Appellant

to contact Respondents regarding the decision
not to pay the rent (D. 42, 47) until on or
about March 3, 1971, when Appellant's
attorney, William S. Richards, wrote to
Respondent E. A. Russell.
22.

(D. 47)

Tiie letter (Exh. P-6) states

that the sublessee, Ski Park City West, Inc.,
"is being requested to pay you directly in
this instance;" and Respondent Russell was
requested to contact Mr. Ensign in California.
23.

On March 10, 1971, Arthur H.

Nielsen (then acting as attorney for Ensign)
wrote to Defendant Robert W. Major,
responding to a previous couununication from

Mr. Major to Mr. Ensign (Exh. F-5) in which
Defendant was advised that the payment due
by Ski Park City West on the "sublease" of
-22-

the property had been made to Appellant in
the fall of 1970; that, in turn, Appellant
had not paid Respondents the rent due on
November 1, 1970, on the primary lease so
that "it now stands in jeopardy of cancellation.
A copy of this letter was also sent to William

s.

Richards, attorney for Appellant.
24.

(Exh. P-7)

On March 11, 1971, Appellant

gave notice by certified mail to Appellant
and to Defendants Major-Blakeney Corporation
and Mr. Robert W. Major that there had been
and was a default in the payment of rent due
under the lease and that "unless such
default in the payment of rent is corrected
by paying the rent due and owing on November
1, 1970, together with interest thereon to
date of payment as provided by law on or
before 45 days from receipt of this notice,
lessor shall consider this lease terminated
and cancelled."
25.

(Exh. P-8)

This notice was duly received
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and acknowledged by Appellant on March 12,

1971.

(Exh. P-8)
26.

Respondents

The notice further provided that
claimed damages in the sum of

$2,500.00 pursuant to the provisions of
paragraph VIII of the lease.

27.

(Exh. P-8)

Nothing thereafter was done to

correct the default in the lease; but
Defendant Robert

w.

Major refused to pick up

his copy of the notice from the post office.
(D. 57)

28.

In consequence of this, on March

29, 1971, a further letter was written to
Defendant Major, with a copy to William S.
Richards, attorney for Appellant, in which
notice was again given of the default and
with the statement "such default must be
corrected on or before April 26, 1971, in
accordance with the terms of the Russell
lease."

(Exh. P-9)

29.

It was not until June
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1971_

(more than two months after the expiration of
the year lease period and six weeks after the
end of the 45-day notice period), that
Appellant made any effort to pay the rent due
the preceding November 1, 1970.

At that time,

on June 7, 1971, a check in the amount of
$4,855.18 was tendered, together with a letter
dated June 7, 1971, to Arthur H. Nielsen,
attorney for Plaintiffs, in payment of the
rent.

(Exh. P-10)
30.

The amount so tendered did not

include any interest.
31.

(Exhs. P-10, P-11)

On June 15, 1971, said check was

rejected and returned to Appellant with a
letter accompanying stating that the lease had
been terminated and that in any event the
amount was insufficient and therefore the
tender was rejected.

(Exh. P-13)

Appellant claims that because the
default provision of the lease (Par. VIII)
provides that "in the event lessee fails to
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correct said default within such further time
as is reasonably necessary to cure the same,
lessee shall quit and surrender the premises,"
there was an issue of fact to be tried as to
what constituted "a reasonable time."
As stated herein before, the lease was
prepared by lessee's attorney and therefore
the provisions thereof should be construed
against Appellant.

Further, it would appear

that this provision had no application to the
payment of rent since such a clause is co11UD0nly
used where the default consists of the failure
to repair or other similar neglect which
requires some form of continuing conduct to
remedy.

In such a situation, if the lessee

has commenced to correct the default within
the notice period, it is protected in being
given further "reasonable time beyond the
expiration of the" notice to complete the same.
In the present situation, however,
there was only the single act of payment of
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the rent which was required.

This Appellant

could have done without any additional time
involved.

In fact, as stated above, the money

was apparently available at all times to pay
the rent; but Appellant wilfully refused to
comply with the terms of the lease or the
notice of default.
Finally, even if it were to be assumed
that Appellant should have a "reasonable time"
in which to correct the default by paying the
rent, as a matter of law such time had expired
prior to June 7, 1971.

This Court has hereto-

fore passed on what constitutes a reasonable
time in a situation involving a default for
failure to make payments under a contract to
purchase realty.

In the case of Pacific

Development Company v. Stewart, 113 Utah 403,
195 P.2d 748, the supreme court held, as a
matter of law, that 23 days was, under the
undisputed facts, a reasonable time in which
to give a defaulting purchaser under contract

-27-

-to make up delinquent payments of $557.50.

In

doing so, the court reversed the decision of
the lower court.

In that case the seller had

advised the delinquent purchaser that unless
the delinquent payments were brought current
within seven days, the contract would be
cancelled and forfeited.

After stating that

the purchaser was entitled to
time" in which to make up such delinquent
payments, the court held as a matter of law
that he had been given such time.
We submit that under the authority of
Gerard v. Young, 20 U.2d 30, 432 P.2d 343,
summary judgment was proper.

That case

involved an action for termination of a cafe
lease where summary judgment for plaintiff was
granted by the trial court.

The supreme court

affirmed the determination of the trial court
granting summary judgment, stating that "under
our rules of civil procedure a 'summary judgment'
shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
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depositions and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

(Rule 56(c))"

II

THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ERRONEOUSLY
APPLY THE LAW TO THE UNDISPUTED FACTS.
A.

There was a default in the payment

of rent.
Although Appellant apparently concedes
the facts heretofore outlined, it argues that
the notice given was ineffectual because it
ignored "any additional time beyond a fortyfive day period."
We believe that this claim has been
clearly answered by what has been stated hereinabove.

However, lest there be some confusion

concerning the designation of 45 days, it
should be pointed out that paragraph VIII of
the lease specifically states that the basis
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for forfeiture is the continuation of default
"for more than forty-five (45) days after
written notice."
Appellant further argues on page 11 of
its brief "that it did not receive the notice
of March 11, 1971, until after April 1st of
the same year."
to the fact.

This is absolutely contrary

The notice, Exhibit P-8, has

attached thereto the signed receipt showing
delivery to, and acceptance by, Appellant on
March 12, 1971.
Finally, Appellant states that the
termination on May 4, 1971 (after the 45-day
grace period expired on April 26, 1971),
rendered "further action by Appellant useless
and futile."

Why then did it thereafter make

an attempt to pay the rent without interest on
June 7, 1971?

No explanation was given or

attempted as to the failure to pay the rent
within the "grace" period.
Tile case of Shoemaker v. Pioneer
-30·

Investments, 14 U.2d 250, 381 P.2d 735,
involved an action by the landlord against the
tenant to recover possession of realty, for
damages for unlawful detention and for unpaid
rent.

The facts there disclosed that defendant

failed to pay the truces on the property or the
rent for a period of two months, whereupon the
plaintiff served the defendant a notice which
required the defendant to pay the taxes and
past due rent or vacate the premises.
Although a check was issued for the payment of
the rent, it was returned twice by the bank
upon which it was drawn marked "return to maker."
Thereafter, the defendant tendered a check in
the amount of $300.00 in payment of the rent,
which tender was refused by the plaintiff.
The court determined that in view of the foregoing facts, plaintiff had served the defendant
with a proper notice and that the plaintiff
had the right upon giving of such notice to
terminate the lease.
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We submit that there was a default and
that Appellant, as a matter of law, failed to
cure the same after having been given proper
notice so to do.
B.

Appellant is not entitled to

equitable relief from the forfeiture.
After having ignored every opportunity
to pay the rent which was due November 1, 1970,
until more than two months after the end of
the year lease period and six weeks after the
end of the 45-day grace period given in the
notice, Appellant now urges this Court that it
is entitled to "equitable relief."
In an attempt to bolster its position
in this regard, Appellant goes outside the
Record to develop alleged facts and draw therefrom completely false assumptions.

There was

never any "collusion" by Respondents with anyone to deprive Appellant of the lease.

Every

effort was made to get Appellant to pay; and
Appellant acknowledges that it was· able to pay
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at all times.
In the case of Groendycke v. Ellis,
205 Kan. 545, 470 P.2d 832, the Supreme Court
of Kansas held that although the court may
grant relief from a forfeiture for non payment
of rent, it will not do so where the failure
to pay is wilful, calculated or persistent or
under circumstances negating exercise of good
faith.
If ever there was a case of wilful,
calculated and persistent refusal to conform
to the conditions of the lease, it is this one.
C.

Appellant is not entitled to the

"Redemption and Restoration Provisions" of
Section 78-36-10, UCA, 1953, as amended.

A casual glance at Section 78-36-10,
UCA, 1953, as amended, demonstrates that this
statute has no application here.

First of all,

it reads "when the proceeding is for an
unlawful detainer."

Obviously this is not an

action for unlawful detainer, as recognized by
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Appellant in its initial recitation of the
nature of action on page 1 of its brief.
Further, the statute does not apply
even in unlawful detainer actions unless the
lease "has not by its terms expired."

By the

terms of this lease, it has terminated by
forfeiture where the rent has not been paid as
required.
In Baker v. Lehrer, 210 Or. 635, 312
P.2d 1072, the court held that where the rent
was tendered by a tenant 26 days after the time
reserved in the lease and 16 days after the
statutory grace period for paying the rent,
there was a forfeiture for non payment of the
rent even though payment was tendered before
forfeiture was actually declared by the landlord.
We also point out that at the time
judgment was rendered in this case (March 17,
1972) another rental year had gone by; and if
the action were one to enforce payment of rent,
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the judgment would have included not only the
obligation to pay the rent for the year 1970-71
but also the rental year 1971-72, which amount
would have exceeded $10,000.00, including
interest and liquidated damages.

At no time

did Appellant tender into court the amount
which would have accrued under the lease to
the date of judgment.

In this connection, the

decision of this Court in Conunercial Block Realty
Company v. Merchant's Protective Association,
71 Utah 505, 267 Pac. 1009, is pertinent.
There the court held that if the tender of
rent is insufficient in amount, it constitutes
no tender at all.
D.

'I.'he lower court properly awarded

$2.500.00 liquidated damages.
The Lease and Purchase Agreement
specifically states that "Because of the
difficulties in ascertaining the damages that
would thus be sustained, if any, by Lessors,
it is agreed that Lessee shall pay to Lessors
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the sum of $2,500 as exclusive, fixed and
liquidated damages."
Appellant states there was no evidence
that the $2,500.00 was "reasonably related to
the actual damages sustained by Respondents."
This is not true.

Respondents did not receive

any rent at all for the period March 31, 1970,
to March 31, 1971.

This was the reason for

cancelling the lease.
In Perkins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468,
243 P.2d 446, this Court stated the law to be
that where the parties to a contract stipulate
the amount of liquidated damages that shall be
paid in case of a breach, such stipulation is,

as a general rule, enforceable, if the amount
stipulated is not disproportionate to the
damages actually sustained.
In Bramwell Investment Company v.
Uggla, 81 Utah 85, 16 P.2d 913, 916_, the
supreme court held that the amount of forfeiture
of $500.00 on a contract of $5,128.00 was "not
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greatly disproportionate to the actual damage."
There is nothing to show that the
amount of $2,500.00 is disproportionate to the
loss sustained by Respondents in this case.
The liquidated damage provision was inserted
by Appellant's attorney and should be enforced.
E.

The granting of the motion for

summary judgment did not destroy "severable and
distinct privileges" of Appellant.
Appellant contends in this regard that
it has been deprived of an option to purchase
and right of first refusal by the action of
the lower court.

This argument is quickly

disposed of by the decision of this Court in
the case of Shoemaker v. Pioneer Investments,
supra.

There the lower court found that the

lease had been terminated by written notice.
On appeal the supreme court affirmed.

Likewise,

the defendant in the court below filed a
counterclaim seeking to exercise an option to
purchase the premises in accordance with a
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provision in the lease providing for such
privilege.

The supreme court held that the

lower court, having found that the lease had
been terminated some eight months prior,
properly dismissed the counterclaim."

(381

P.2d at p. 736).

In the instant matter Appellant did not
seek to exercise its option to purchase and has
not done so to this date.

However, what was

said by the supreme court in the Shoemaker case
would indicate that it could not do so after
the lease has been terminated for failure to
pay rent.
SUMMARY
Respondents respectfully submit that
the judgment of the lower court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

zf/Lb4/-<_,-/

Arthur H. Nielsen
NIELSEN, CONDER, HANSEN & HENRIO.
Attorneys for Respondents
410 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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